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The EU offers a suitable milieu for the comparison and harmonisation of healthcare across different languages, cultures,
and jurisdictions (albeit with a supranational legal framework), which could provide improvements in healthcare
standards across the bloc. There are specific ethico-legal issues with the use of data in healthcare research that mandate
a different approach from other forms of research. The use of healthcare data over a long period of time is similar to the
use of tissue in biobanks. There is a low risk to subjects but it is impossible to gain specific informed consent given the
future possibilities for research. Large amounts of data on a subject present a finite risk of re-identification. Consequently,
there is a balancing act between this risk and retaining sufficient utility of the data. Anonymising methods need to take
into account the circumstances of data sharing to enable an appropriate balance in all cases. There are ethical and policy
advantages to exceeding the legal requirements and thereby securing the social licence for research. This process would
require the examination and comparison of data protection laws across the trading bloc to produce an ethico-legal
framework compatible with the requirements of all member states. Seven EU jurisdictions are given consideration
in this critique.
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The improvement of healthcare can be accelerated by an
information governance framework that facilitates audit
and research across an entire region [1]. The European
Union (EU) offers an opportunity to maximise the benefits
of harmonisation of healthcare across different languages,
cultures, and jurisdictions (albeit with a supranational
legal framework), enabling improvement of healthcare by
comparisons across the entire supranational trading bloc.
This process would be facilitated by the examination and
comparison of data protection laws and ethical require-
ments across the EU to produce an ethico-legal frame-
work compatible with the requirements of all member
states. This process is a fundamental part of achieving a
Digital Single Market and integral to the free movement
of services [2]. Patients are becoming more mobile with* Correspondence: barbara.pierscionek@ntu.ac.uk
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(http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zehealth tourism a major issue for regulators. Facilitating
comparisons between providers in countries will enable
genuinely informed choices to be made by consumers.
Big Data is a term that has been used broadly in the aca-
demic literature and has been characterised by the 5 Vs:
volume, velocity, variety, veracity and value [3]. It involves
the integration of large volumes of data from various
sources that are gathered speedily to inform timely
decision-making. The data need to be reliable and provide
some benefit. Big Data has enormous potential for per-
forming large-scale epidemiological studies at low cost
and improving the quality of healthcare via the large
quantity of healthcare data gathered routinely [4, 5]. How-
ever, the term Big Data is often misused to simply mean
the analysis of large datasets. The issues of scale alone do
not warrant any special treatment; Big Data is often used
to simply mean data science.Main text
This critique applies to the use of all forms of data for
healthcare research, particularly the secondary use ofle is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
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Information (PII) without consent is both an ethical and
legal issue. Where Big Data is being used directly for
healthcare improvement, this will normally come under
the rubric of the ordinary use of medical records for
management of healthcare services, and therefore does
not require consent. However, this justification in the
case of the Google DeepMind project being run with the
Royal Free NHS (National Health Service)Trust has been
questioned, and the Information Commissioner’s Office
obliged to investigate after complaints were made [6].
The dividing line between audit and research is blurred
[7] and the advent of data science arguably makes this
blurred line even more significant since Big Data makes
research on routinely collected data much more practic-
able, as opposed to the traditional reliance on datasets
collected specifically for research purposes. If the activity
is deemed to fall under the research category and the
data is still PII, consent must be sought unless an applic-
able exemption can be applied. The laws and ethics of
healthcare data include provisions where the gaining of
specific informed consent will be impracticable and the
research is in the public good. The relevant laws leave
the process of determining which research will be ex-
empt implicitly down to Research Ethics Committees
(RECs) or the equivalent, often in combination with data
protection agencies. In the UK, the approval of both
RECs and the Confidentiality Advisory Group are re-
quired for the use of NHS data. In Italy, the Garante is
required to authorise healthcare data use even when
consent has been obtained, unless the research comes
under the general waiver (Article 110 of the Personal
Data Protection Code).
Alternatively, data can be anonymised. Anonymisation
renders data no longer personally identifiable in law. The
legal standards do not require re-identification to be im-
possible as any such requirement would render the proc-
essed data almost useless [8]. Anonymisation ought
therefore not to be seen as an all-or-nothing process, but
rather a procedure to reduce the risk of re-identification
to an acceptable level. The risk of re-identification is
dependent on a number of factors, which makes the im-
position of a single legal standard problematic. For ex-
ample, it is problematic trying to determine whether a
dynamic Internet Provider Address (IPA) is PII or not, as
the case of Breyer v Germany demonstrates [9]. The anon-
ymisation framework published by the UK Anonymisation
Network (UKAN) emphasizes the difficulty in formulating
a comprehensive guideline [10]. Anonymisation prevents
the linking of records and elimination of duplicate re-
cords. Where records are identified by a unique code, this
can be prevented and is termed pseudonymisation.
RECs and their equivalents often lack expertise in data
protection law and related issues such as the difficulty indefining anonymisation. Much medical research is per-
formed on data gathered specifically for research pur-
poses and Big Data offers further opportunity to
perform an enormous variety of research on data already
gathered. Data protection laws offer protection for users
regarding secondary uses, with consent being the usual
mechanism. However, there are derogations for research
of public benefit. This is especially important for Big
Data projects, where gaining individual and specific con-
sent poses significant logistical difficulties.
Given the wide-ranging protection for the autonomy,
privacy and dignity of data subjects by the relevant laws,
RECs arguably could and should have a light touch when
faced with applications that deal with such issues. The
main factor where the authors consider that RECs ought
to require more protection than necessarily required by
data protection law is anonymization as in certain coun-
tries, notably in the UK, the legal standard is not suitable
for the protection of the subjects of medical research.
The current data protection regime in the EU is based
on the Data Protection Directive. National transpositions
of the Data Protection Directive have varying standards
for anonymisation (Table 1). Where the relevant ethico-
legal standards are unclear, there is the potential for un-
necessary regulatory delay for projects. The General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) will apply from June
2018; regulations are directly applicable, so that citizens
can rely on them for protection of rights. The GDPR will
not apply if and when the UK exist the European Union,
although planned legislation would enable its continued
enforceability (the so-called “Great Repeal Act”) [11].
EU data protection law
EU data protection acts all have the same basic features
but with some national differences as illustrated in
Table 1. This permits the adjustment of protections ac-
cording to the attitude of publics. For example, Denmark
has used a system of broad consent to promote legitim-
ate research using genetic data on the basis of an “opt-
out” system which assumes that an individual consents
unless he or she says otherwise [12]. Recently, it was re-
vealed that a large amount of healthcare data had been
retained illegally in the Danish General Practice Data-
base (DAMD), as the limited ambit of the original
scheme had been exceeded [13].
The protections for privacy will vary from member state
to member state, according to both the implementation of
the Directive and the ‘reasonable expectations’ of the pub-
lic. The applicable regulations and supervisory body are of
the country where the data controller has its establish-
ment. The nationality of the subject is immaterial (as per
Weltimmo v Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és Információszabadság
Hatóság). The GDPR will bring in a “one-stop shop” re-
gime for national data protection authorities (Recital 127).
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ply transferring data to the EU member state with the
weakest protections, even if this were deemed ethical.
Although member states are not able to increase the
level of protection, they can widen its scope. The Opin-
ions and reports of the Article 29 Working Party have
helped to develop a shared understanding of the interpret-
ation of the terms in the Directive. The UK approximation
is the Data Protection Act 1998. Article 7 lays out the con-
ditions for lawful processing of personal data:
Member States shall provide that personal data may
be processed only if:
(a) the data subject has unambiguously given his
consent; or
(b)processing is necessary for the performance of a
contract to which the data subject is party or in
order to take steps at the request of the data subject
prior to entering into a contract; or
(c)processing is necessary for compliance with a legal
obligation to which the controller is subject; or
(d)processing is necessary in order to protect the vital
interests of the data subject; or
(e)processing is necessary for the performance of a task
carried out in the public interest or in the exercise
of official authority vested in the controller or in a
third party to whom the data are disclosed ; or
(f ) processing is necessary for the purposes of the
legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by
the third party or parties to whom the data are
disclosed, except where such interests are
overridden by the interests for fundamental rights
and freedoms of the data subject which require
protection under Article 1 d).
These restrictions apply to personal data only and
there are limited derogations for the use of personal data
for research purposes without consent. Exemption only
applies where consent is not “reasonably practicable”
and the research is “in the public interest”. Healthcare
management and audit is a compatible purpose, and
therefore does not require consent. Table 1 compares
seven member states on the issues of anonymisation and
consent:
The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
The GDPR is enforceable from mid-2018.[14] The import-
ant clauses in the GDPR are:
1) Specific provision for categorical consent to research
2) Specific categorization of research as a compatible
purpose
3) Derogation from prohibition on processing of
sensitive data for research4) Clarification that pseudonymised data is still
personal data.
5) Broadening of the definition of personal data
Exactly how broadly “certain areas of research” (Recital
33) should be interpreted is not clear. “Recognized eth-
ical standards” certainly allow for subjects to consent to
projects with a similar risk. When there is a significantly
different risk (quantitatively or qualitatively), it may ex-
tend outside the remit of the broad consent. This is an
area where continuing governance with subject and/or
public input can usefully guide decision-making.
The derogation for scientific research on healthcare
(and other sensitive) data applies only to research in the
public interest (Recital 52). It is not clear whether or not
this might exclude all commercial projects, or only those
where there are no benefit sharing arrangements. Pre-
sumably this is a different test from Section 9.2 g where
“substantial public interest” is required. The Confidenti-
ality Advisory Group (CAG) in the UK has publicised its
interpretation of “public interest”, which requires a bal-
ance between harms and risk, with the aim of determin-
ing what is likely to be reasonably acceptable to the
public [15].
The definition of personal data has broadened. Al-
though the types of data that might lead to the individ-
ual being identifiable are stipulated, personal data
themselves are any data that relate to such an identifi-
able individual. This is part of a global trend [16–18].
This reaction to the possibility of re-identification has
the potential for decreasing incentives to use techniques
such as anonymisation and pseudo-anonymisation.
There is allowance for differences and a margin of
manoeuvre for member states to specify rules, including
those that pertain to processing sensitive data, the cir-
cumstances of specific processing and setting out condi-
tions that determine whether or not processing of
personal data is lawful (Recital 10).
Data use in research
There is a fundamental need in long-running projects
for an effective governance mechanism that has suitable
and effective input from research subjects. The one-off
granting of ethical approval is insufficient to guarantee
research subjects the protection that they should have.
Given the difficulties predicted by Collingridge about the
regulation of technology, [19] a reflexive governance
framework backed by law would be preferable to cum-
bersome legislation given its greater ability to adapt to
emerging challenges and technologies. The need to make
more use of the law for promotion of public interest has
been highlighted [20].
The law often takes an individualistic approach which
can fail to take sufficient account of the wider public
Rumbold and Pierscionek BMC Medical Ethics  (2017) 18:27 Page 5 of 11benefits of Big Data and data science. A governance
framework for data science that better reflects the altru-
istic intentions behind participation is needed. This
would enable participation, whilst providing appropriate
protection from exploitation. The GDPR promises to
better harmonise data protection law in the EU as it is
directly applicable, but there remains flexibility for mem-
ber states to vary protection. Although differences in
data protection law of member states should not hinder
data transfer (Article 1.2 of the Data Protection Direct-
ive), this legal doctrine may not reassure RECs that are
faced with the potential of data transfer to member
states with lower protections than those found in their
own. Additionally, the regulations do not address in de-
tail the ethical issues. Although it is entirely appropriate
that regulations are not too prescriptive on an evolving
area of ethics and law, there are concerns that decisions
made by RECs are either too variable or too restrictive
to prevent this flexibility from being exploited. A useful
framework for considering data research is one based by
three pillars – anonymisation, consent, and governance.
If one pillar is weak, the other two have to be stronger.
There is a large body of academic literature on bio-
banking that is highly relevant to the ethico-legal frame-
work for Big Data in healthcare. A notable similarity is
the difficulty in gaining consent when future projects
cannot be predicted but the risks to individuals remain
low. A clear difference is that individuals have usually
been enrolled into a biobank and given consent for their
information to be used for research, although as a panel
discussion at the 2016 UK Biobank 1st Annual Meeting
revealed, the exact ambit of to what exactly participants
had consented was not clear to all. There was some de-
bate over whether or not biopsy samples were part of
the medical record, and therefore whether further con-
sent was necessary to do research on these clinical sam-
ples.1 An analogous situation is the reuse of heelprick
blood samples (taken routinely from newborn babies to
screen for certain diseases such as phenylketonuria) for
further research [21, 22]. Another important difference
between biological samples and standard medical record
data is that genetic data derived from these samples are
seen more as a community resource than personal
healthcare data [23–26]. However, both are considered
sensitive personal data requiring special protection and
permission for their usage.
Regulatory barriers
The restrictions on the use of health data for research
can be categorized thus:
Legal: Statutory and case law restrictions on use of
data or invasion of privacy will involve remedies and/or
punishments for infringement. There is a common law
duty of confidentiality in the UK and the right to privacyunder Article 8 of the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR). The UK law has to be interpreted in line
with the EU Data Protection Directive (where directly
effective), the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, and
the ECHR. The GDPR will be directly applicable.
Ethical/moral: The application of healthcare ethics
needs to consider the major principles of beneficence,
non-maleficence, respect for autonomy and confidential-
ity. In the UK, a general practitioner is required under
the Health and Social Care Act 2012 to disclose patient
details; General Medical Council requirements and com-
mon law confidentiality duties permit these disclosures
to fulfil statutory duties GPs have been threatened with
termination of their contract over plans to opt all of
their patients out of Care.data) [27].
Moral considerations concern subjective personal beliefs
about right and wrong. It has been argued that there is a
moral duty to engage in research [28]. The UK Medical
Research Council report found 60% of the public felt a re-
sponsibility as beneficiaries of medical research to partici-
pate in medical research provided suitable safeguards
were in place [29]. It might be considered immoral to ex-
ploit patients by selling their healthcare data to commer-
cial concerns (as proposed in the Care.data project).
Professional: Professional regulators and other profes-
sional craft bodies may impose stricter duties of patient
confidentiality than the law requires – but there is a
duty to comply with statutory requirements.
Cultural: Data sharing that is legally, ethically and
professionally acceptable may nonetheless be considered
unacceptable by service users [30]. Although they may
have no formal means of redress, their objections may
lead to widespread opting out (if available) or a reduc-
tion in trust between healthcare professionals and pa-
tients. Withholding information from healthcare
professionals reduces the veracity of health records and
risks detrimental effects to health. UK consultations sug-
gest a considerable proportion of the population support
the use of their data to improve healthcare whether via
audit or research [29, 31–33].
Ethico-legal issues with data science
The ethical issues that need to be addressed with data
science generally are:
1. “Ownership” of the data
2. Autonomy of the individual
3. Privacy/confidentiality
4. Necessity and proportionality; beneficence/non-
maleficence
If these ethico-legal concerns are not addressed prop-
erly, then any projects will face problems with public
trust.
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There is no property in data (Oxford v Moss, Your
Response Ltd vs Datateam Business Media Ltd). Yet a
database can be intellectual property and therefore intan-
gible property in English law, and can therefore be pro-
tected by copyright. The 2013 Caldicott review of
information governance in the UK confirmed that patients
do not own their NHS data [34–36] (although there can be
patient-owned records, and the ownership of data gener-
ated by medical devices for the ‘Internet of Things’ (IoT) is
an interesting issue that requires further exploration [37]).
The situation in non-common law countries (where
law cannot be made by a court without the necessary
statutes) appears to be the same – there are intellectual
property rights in a database (which may be copyright or
the database right mentioned above), but no property in
data per se. The Database Directive 96/9/EC provides a
sui generis right for database owners to protect databases
not seen as intellectual property due to the lack of
originality.
The passage of the UK Health and Social Care Act
2012 placed the disclosure of certain data to NHS
England outside the main provisions of the Data Protec-
tion Act, which was the UK implementation of the Data
Protection Directive, and also exempted GPs from the
common law duty of confidentiality when disclosing data
to the Health and Social Care Information Centre
(HSCIC). The framework for Care.data arguably contra-
vened the provisions of the GDPR. The Care.data project
was stopped but the framework remains in place for the
secondary use of patient data for research.
Some commentators have advocated that the patient
should (and can) have ownership of their healthcare
data.[38] They argue that the patient holding a personal
health record would counter the obstacles to sharing in-
formation in the interest of the patient and safe health
care. Other commentators believe that the notion that
subjects have even partial interests in their health data or
in bio-specimens would hinder research [35, 36, 39, 40].
Given that altruism is a major motivator of involvement
in medical research, this is not generally problematic – ex-
cept when a small community is being studied e.g. those
with a rare genetic disorder. Here it is notable that pa-
tients and families have in some cases created disease-
specific biobanks, where they retain legal control over the
materials [24]. Where the outputs are expected to be of
benefit to the wider public, involvement of representatives
of the general public must be considered [20]. Altruism as
a motivation feeds into public expectations about uses for
healthcare data.
Autonomy
Returning to the similarities with biobanks, Laurie com-
ments that the consent standard for clinical trials,informed consent, is not possible with a long term project
where the ambit of future individual research studies can-
not be predicted [41]. Further, the ScottisH Informatics
Programme (SHIP) found that an informed public accepted
broad consent as suitable and practical [31]. A US study
confirmed that most subjects (66%) would prefer a wider
form of consent to study-specific consent. The options con-
sidered were consent to any future research projects
authorised under an appropriate governance mechanism,
and categorical consent [42]. Categorical consent is a type
of broad consent but limited to certain nominated categor-
ies of study. There is also the option of dynamic consent
[43]. All forms of broad consent need to have robust mech-
anisms for withdrawal of consent (except dynamic consent).
This need not be retroactive in effect [20].
Regulation of medical research has the purpose of pro-
tecting subjects who by definition are vulnerable. This
entails a degree of paternalism by definition, otherwise it
would be sufficient to simply rely on informed consent.
Some have argued that the paternalism demonstrated by
RECs inappropriately denies research subjects the op-
portunity to take risks they find acceptable. Edwards
et al. make the point that research subjects who are con-
sidered autonomous should be entitled to decide on
which research they participate in rather than have their
choices constrained by a REC; this is considered to be
overprotective and paternalistic [44]. An exception
would be the prohibition on financial inducements with
regard to recruitment. Garrard and Dawson disagree
with this on the grounds of consistency with regards to
antipaternalism [45]. The nature of these projects entails
some level of risk for the data to be useful; rigorously
anonymised data that excludes the possibility of re-
identification at a later date is almost useless. This is
where the concept of differential privacy is useful, as it
demonstrates the background risk to privacy from in-
formation already in the public domain. The risks of
damage distress relate to data breaches or misuse of in-
formation [30].
The nature of Big Data projects may make gaining in-
formed consent impractical. If consent is not obtained,
opting out must be a practical possibility – which requires
publicity and education of the public so that such a right
can be exercised. The use of anonymised data requires no
consent, but certain types of research require records to
have an identifier. The main mechanism for accommodat-
ing both requirements is pseudonymisation, where typic-
ally identifiers are replaced with a unique identifier. The
patient can only be re-identified with the aid of a key code.
Such pseudonymised data may or may not be considered
as personal data depending on the circumstances and the
member state – in particular, third parties without access
to the key code may or may not be able to treat the data
as anonymised depending on the test applied (Table 1).
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nymised data as personal (Recital 26).
Consultations for SHIP have shown that personal con-
trol over health data is considered important even when
data is anonymised [31]. This issue is relevant to social
license rather than legality per se. Some people might
find the use of their anonymised data objectionable and
this could occur if the particular research project
offended their morals. In such cases it is difficult to see
what right is at stake, although some have argued that
even the sharing of anonymised healthcare data is
breaching confidentiality [46].
Privacy/Confidentiality
The use of information technology in hospitals facilitates
delving into personal data on a scale not possible with
physical hospital records. There have been well-
publicised breaches of confidence of celebrities in the
USA; in one case, a notable American footballer’s med-
ical records were viewed by 1,754 separate employees
during an admission [47].
There have been several large-scale hacks (over 1 mil-
lion individuals affected) of medical records in the USA
[38]; one affected 80 million individuals. A recent study
found major data security flaws in many accredited
health apps available via the UK NHS Choices Health
Apps library [48]. There have notable disastrous conse-
quences from central government handling of sensitive
data, and the NHS has a relatively poor record on data
protection – it was deemed to be the worst organization
in the UK for serious data breaches in 2014 according to
ICO statistics [49]. USB sticks have been lost, [50] hard
drives with patient data on sold on EBay, [51] and faxes
and emails misdirected [52, 53]. Whether or not these
lapses are reflected in public attitudes is questionable –
an IPSOS Mori poll found that the NHS fared relatively
well in terms of public trust. Trust on data protection in
the NHS was 36%, and in GPs 41% but media, internet
companies, telecommunications companies and insur-
ance companies were trusted by only 4–7%.[54] The
Centre for Media, Data and Society looked at data
breaches across Europe and found that Germany,
Greece, the Netherlands, Norway and the UK had the
greatest number of reported breaches [55]. Overall 2% of
these breaches involved medical organizations.
The two main protections for subject privacy are data
security and anonymisation. Data security is an integral
part of the ethico-legal framework, and appropriate tech-
nology, procedures and training are essential to ensure
that good data security standards are maintained. Anon-
ymisation removes the consideration of data as personal
and hence any coverage of it by data protection legislation
(many of the member states’ statutes are personal data
protection acts).The definition of personal data in Recital 26 of the Dir-
ective states:
to determine whether a person is identifiable account
should be taken of all the means likely reasonably to
be used either by the controller or by any other
person to identify the said person [56].
It adds that:
data may be rendered anonymous and retained in a
form in which identification of the data subject is no
longer possible
This has been interpreted to mean that anonymisation
must be irreversible, which rules out pseudonymised data
as being anonymised under the Directive. One-way crypt-
ography is treated as anonymous (subject to certain ca-
veats), because it is irreversible. The test for anonymisation
in the UK refers to information held by the data controller,
therefore data that is provided to researchers who do not
have the key code can be treated as anonymised.
R v Department of Health, ex parte Source Informatics
establishes that the provision of anonymised information
does not breach the common law duty of confidentiality.
Common Service Agency v Scottish Information Commis-
sioner confirms that anonymised data does not come
under the provisions of the Data Protection Act; how-
ever, the case avoids the issue of what constitutes anon-
ymisation. The data in this case was requested to be
released after ‘Barnardisation’,2 but this weak form of
disguise would not necessarily prevent re-identification
given the nature of the data sets. The House of Lords
remitted the matter of whether or not the data were
anonymised or not back to the Scottish Information
Commissioner to decide, as an issue of fact not law. This
deference on the issue means that the pronouncement
by the UK Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO),
that anonymisation is deemed effective when the risk of
re-identification is remote rather than absent, neverthe-
less recognises the small risk of re-identification.
The test applied does not vary according to the con-
text or the sensitivity of the data. Re-identification is a
challenge that older regulations fail to address ad-
equately, although the Data Protection Act provides that
personal data is:
data which relate to a living individual3 who can be
identified—
(a) from those data,
or
(b) from those data and other information which is in
the possession of, or is likely to come into the
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expression of opinion about the individual and any
indication of the intentions of the data controller or
any other person in respect of the individual [italics
authors’].
The Confidentiality and Security Advisory Group for
Scotland stated that:
100% anonymity is almost impossible to achieve
without the data set being reduced to one data item,
rendering it of little use for most research purposes [8].
There are a number of different standards of anonymi-
sation applied across Europe. The ICO states that the
potential for re-identification is:
essentially unpredictable because it can never be
predicted with certainty what data is already available
or what data may be released in the future [57].
The same uncertainties are behind the Australian Priv-
acy Commissioner’s statement about treating anonymised
data as personal information [16]. However, the ICO’s as-
sessment did not affect the decision in FS50565190
against Queen Mary University of London relating to the
PACES trial [58]. The ICO held that the University could
not withhold data that had been anonymised to the ICO’s
satisfaction despite concerns about activists trying to re-
identify participants. The ICO wanted specific explanation
as to how re-identification would be achieved. It can
be persuasively argued that the motives of those wish-
ing to use the data should affect the level of anon-
ymisation required.
A further solution to the problem of re-identification
is to restrict access to researchers who have given assur-
ances they will not attempt re-identification. These cur-
rently make no difference to whether or not the data is
classified as indirectly identifiable or not, despite the
benefits of such arrangements. They are an integral part
of information governance arrangements for data “safe
havens” [59]. In the UK, Accredited Safe Havens are
“contractually and legally bound to process data in ways
that prevent the identity of individuals to whom the data
relates from being identified” [60]. There are similar
mechanisms in Ontario, Canada for “prescribed entities”
where approved policies must be in place to protect data
(the Institute for Clinical Evaluative Sciences specifically
states this in their privacy policy) [61]. Additionally, any
data that has been re-identified becomes PII as a matter
of law. The likelihood of re-identification is contested,
[62] but the conclusion of both the Nuffield Council on
Bioethics and SHIP is that the ‘consent or anonymise’
approach is not sufficient to guarantee the protection of
subjects’ interests [63, 64]. Data security can be moreimportant than anonymity. Existing data available about a
subject pose a background risk to privacy, and differential
privacy is a technique for assessing whether the research
will increase that risk or not. The reasonable expectations
of the public are that a minimal risk is acceptable, particu-
larly if measures are in place to reduce risks.
Necessity and proportionality
All the rights protected by the European Convention on
Human Rights, bar Article 3 (prohibition of torture, in-
humane or degrading treatment or punishment), are
qualified rights, so interference with Convention Rights
is permitted when certain criteria are met. The United
Kingdom is obliged as a contracting party to ensure the
compatibility of British law with the upholding of Con-
vention Rights. In Handyside v United Kingdom, the
European Court of Human Rights held that this needed
in order to be necessary and proportionate. “Necessary”
implied a ‘pressing social need’. Exemptions have to be
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, and the
reasons given have to be relevant and sufficient.
Several documents have sought to emphasize the pub-
lic interest in benefitting from audit and research as a
justification for interference with the rights to privacy
and autonomy. This needs to be assessed on a case-by-
case basis, which entails the adoption of the principled
proportionate governance model or something very
similar. The Directive requires a ‘substantial public inter-
est’ for member states’ exemptions above and beyond the
Directive’s requirements, and it seems perilous to rely on
the public interest per se to justify routine epidemiological
research using personal health data. Indeed, a report for
the European Commission indicated that this sort of justi-
fication may be violation of the Directive [65].
In practice, the ICO and other regulatory bodies in the
UK tend to default to the “consent or anonymise” model
(partly due to the provision of rights to private life under
Article 8 [1] of the ECHR).
The beneficence/non-maleficence considerations for re-
search data banks are similar to those for biobanks. The
main risk is of disclosure of sensitive information. It has
been shown that the combination of three pieces of data
could identify 87% of US residents – five-digit zip code,
birth date, and gender [66]. Anonymisation to a suffi-
ciently high standard eliminates the risks, but also reduces
the usefulness of the data. Thus there is a balancing act
for any project that is best achieved through a human
rights approach. There are different levels of sensitivity
even within the category of healthcare data [67]. Differen-
tial privacy is particularly helpful in this regard [68].
The Principled Proportionate Governance Model (PPGM)
The SHIP engaged with the public in a far more effective
way to determine what the reasonable expectations of
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Care.data project in England. This secured the social li-
cence for the use of personal health data and did not ex-
clude the use of public data for commercial purposes
subject to certain caveats [31]. The recent Wellcome
Trust-commissioned study had similar findings [69]. The
reasonable expectations of the population help deter-
mine what compatible purposes are (Article 6(b) of the
Directive).
Their findings were that in line with principled propor-
tionate governance, projects that do not fit the ‘consent or
anonymise’ could be authorised under the statutory frame-
work by the Privacy Advisory Committee (the CAG is the
relevant body in England and Wales). Therefore, the pa-
radigm would be “consent, anonymise or authorise”
(addressing the three pillars mentioned above).
Getting data protection law right is vital for healthcare
improvement in the EU; it will ensure the trust of citi-
zens in the security and confidentiality of the healthcare
data and their continued support for medical research.
The potential for a massive acceleration in improve-
ments in patient safety can be realised. The large
(and unexpected) number of opt-outs from Care.data
illustrate the penalties for getting it wrong [70, 71]. At its
worst, data issues can lead to patients lacking confidence
in their healthcare provider and avoiding public healthcare
altogether [72]. The public need to be involved in a mean-
ingful way, and this requires education on the issues.
Transparency about the risks involved is vital, and the ma-
jority of the public accepts a small risk if there are appro-
priate measures in place to mitigate them. The tricky
balancing act between data utility and privacy can be
achieved via proportionate governance mechanisms. This
and a commitment to research in the public interest will
ensure that there is a social licence for Big Data healthcare
research [73].
Conclusions
There is divergence between EU jurisdictions on dealing
with the ethico-legal aspects of data for healthcare re-
search. The key issues are those that respect autonomy
and privacy notably, the requirements for informed con-
sent and anonymisation. The increasing focus on data
sharing brings tensions with the demands of data pro-
tection. Participants in a clinical study might rightly feel
(as may the researchers) that a higher standard of anon-
ymisation than usual is appropriate, or that different
standards should be appropriate for the use of re-
searchers compared with public release.
Whatever framework is in place, the evidence from
previous studies supports continuing public engagement
within the governance mechanism to ensure that the re-
quirements for social licence are fulfilled and the re-
search community continues to deserve the trust ofsociety. A one-off process of obtaining consent can no
longer be considered sufficient in all circumstances, es-
pecially with long-term ongoing Big Data projects. Sub-
jects can no longer be seen as passive and reciprocity
must be maintained. Public engagement must include
the wider public not just research participants where the
results will be of benefit to the wider general public.
Endnotes
1Personal observation by first author who attended.
2A process of randomly adjusting figures in a dataset
by 1,0, or −1.37
3The DPA unlike many European equivalents does not
cover deceased persons; however, the common law of
confidentiality may apply.
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